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Indigenous Peoples' Rights: Mabo and
Others v. State of Queensland1 - The
Australian High Court Addresses 200
Years of Oppression
GERALD P. MCGINLEY
I. INTRODUCTION
Australian Aboriginals share the common heritage of indigenous peo-
ples. It is a history of violent dispossession, followed by alternating neg-
lect and paternalism, culminating in belated and bewildered concern.' An
international movement has evolved to rectify these wrongs.' 1993 is to be
the International Year of the World's Indigenous Peoples" during which
* Senior Lecturer in International Law, University of Adelaide.
1. Mabo v. Queensland, 107 A.L.R. 1 (1992).
2. See JANINE ROBERTS, MASSACRES TO MINING 13-19 (1981)[hereinafter ROBERTS];
MARC GUMBERT, NEITHER JUSTICE NOR REASON 15-25 (1984); HENRY REYNOLDS, DISPOSSES-
SION (1989)[hereinafter REYNOLDS]. For a discussion of the history and problems of other
indigenous peoples, see Raidza Torres, The Rights of Indigenous Populations: The Emerg-
ing International Norm, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 127 (1991)[hereinafter Torres].
3. There have been three areas of activity. The International Labour Conference has
produced two conventions, Convention 107 Concerning the Protection and Integration of
Indigenous and other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, June
26, 1957, 328 U.N.T.S. 247. In 1989, the Conference adopted a revised version of Convention
107 (Convention 106). See Berman, The International Labour Organization and Indige-
nous Peoples: Revision of ILO Convention No. 107 at the 75th Session of the International
Labour Conference, 1988 THE REviEw 48, 49 (Int'l Convention Jurists 1988); Andree
Lawrey, Contemporary Efforts to Guarantee Indigenous Rights Under International Law,
23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 703, 717-20 (1990). Second, in 1972 the U.N. Human Rights Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities appointed a Spe-
cial Rapporteur on the problems of discrimination against indigenous people. The Rap-
porteur, Jose Martinez Cobo presented a final report in 1983. See Study of the Problem of
Discrimination against Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub2/Add. 1-4 (1986-
87)[hereinafter Cobo Report]. In 1985 the U.N. General Assembly established the U.N.
Fund for Indigenous Populations to assist representation of indigenous populations in the
activities of the Working Group. The Fund was established by G.A. Res. 40/131. See Report
of the Economic and Social Council: United Nations Voluntary Fund for Indigenous
Populations, Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR 43rd Sess., Agenda Item 12,
U.N. Doc. A/43/706 2 (1988). The third area of activity has been the work of non-govern-
mental organizations. The first meeting of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples met in
Canada in 1975; representative' groups are the Four Directions Council, the Maori Council,
the National Aboriginal and Islander Legal Service Secretariat, the National Indian Youth
Council, the Indigenous World Association, the International Indian Treaty Council, The
Indian Council of South America and the Inuit Circumpolar Conference. See The Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Center for Human Rights, Geneva, Fact Sheet No. 9, 3-4 (1990);
Torres, supra note 2, at 151.
4. G.A. Res. 45/164 of 18 Dec. 1990; see U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/39 (1991); see also
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the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples' will present
its Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples6 for adoption by the
United Nations. In Australia the Commonwealth government has estab-
lished the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation' and a Royal Commission
into Aboriginal deaths in custody.' A treaty between the Commonwealth
government and the Aboriginal people has also been proposed.'
On the judicial front, in recent years, Aboriginal litigants relying on
the Western Sahara case"0 have challenged the long standing assumption
that Australia was occupied by peaceful possession of terra nullius.
Rather, they argue that sovereignty was acquired by conquest. This has
important legal consequences. In settled colonies (occupation of terra
nullius) applicable English laws are automatically in force on settlement
because there are no pre-existing laws (or rights), whereas conquered or
ceded colonies retain their indigenous laws until the new sovereign alters
them.1 It has generally been assumed that Australia was a settled colony,
the laws of which did not recognize Aboriginal title. 2 As recently as 1979
in Coe v. Commonwealth" two members of the High Court were firmly of
the view that it was fundamental to the Australian legal system that Aus-
tralia was acquired by settlement and not by conquest.'
In June of 1992, in a watershed opinion, the Australian High Court in
Mabo v. Queensland reversed prior authority, and held in a plurality de-
cision that Australia was not terra nullius when occupied and that signifi-
cant pre-settlement indigenous land rights continue to exist under the
common law of Australia. All judges agreed the acquisition of sovereignty
by the Crown was an act of State that could not be questioned in the
municipal courts; 5 nor was it questioned that on gaining sovereignty the
Reed Brody et al., The 42nd Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities, 13 HUM. RTs. Q. 260, 286 (1991).
5. Established by E.S.C. Res. 1982/34, U.N. Doc. E/82 Supp. 1, at 26 (1982); Douglas
Sanders, The U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 11 HuM. RTS. Q. 406 (1989).
6. See Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Ninth Session,
43d Sess., Agenda Item 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/40/Rev.1, Ann.1, Rec. 33 (1991).
7. Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act, 127 AUSTL. C. ACTS 4685 (Cth. 1991).
8. The Commission handed down its report last year. See 1-11 ROYAL COMMISSION
INTO ABORIGINAL DEATHS IN CUSTODY (1991).
9. See Garth Nettheim & Tony Simpson, Aboriginal Peoples and Treaties, 12 CUR-
RENT AFF. BULL. 18 (1989).
10. Advisory Opinion No. 61, Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 5 (Oct.16).
11. 1 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 108 (1978)[hereinafter BLACKSTONE].
12. Cooper v. Stuart, [1889] 14 App. Cas. 286; Randwick Mun. Council v. Rutledge, 102
C.L.R. 54 (1959); New South Wales v. Commonwealth, 135 C.L.R. 337, 438-9 (1975). See
also Bryan Keon-Cohen, The Makarrata: a Treaty within Australia between Australians,
1985 CURRENT AFF. BULL. 5.
13. Coe v. Commonwealth, 24 A.L.R. 118 (1979).
14. Id. at 129 (Gibbs & Aicken, JJ., concurring). See also Coe v. Commonwealth, 18
A.L.R. 592, 596 (1978)(Mason J.); Re Phillips; Ex parte Aboriginal Development Commis-
sion, 72 A.L.R. 508 (1987).
15. Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 20 (Brennan, J.); 72 (Deane & Gaudron, JJ.); 92 (Dawson, J.);
142 (Toohey, J.).
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Crown acquired radical or absolute title to all lands in Australia," mean-
ing that under the tenure doctrine all land is held ultimately through the
Crown.1 7 The issue in the case was whether, as had always been assumed,
the Crown had also acquired beneficial ownership over all lands, thereby
extinguishing any pre-existing indigenous rights.
Justice Brennan (with whom Mason, C.J., and McHugh, J., con-
curred) held it to be an untenable position that Australia was occupied as
uninhabited territory because its indigenous peoples were few in number
and of such low social order that it would be idle to impute to them legal
rights. The view that Australia was terra nuflius was based on misinfor-
mation, was racially discriminatory and as such was not in keeping with
contemporary international law or current Australian community val-
ues."8 Although the acquisition of sovereignty by the Crown was not justi-
ciable before municipal courts, the courts did have jurisdiction to deter-
mine the consequences of such acquisition under municipal law. 9 Justice
Brennan considered that no territory inhabited by human beings could be
thought to be terra nullius under the common law of Australia.20 It fol-
lowed from this that certain pre-settlement Aboriginal rights continued to
exist under Australian law. Justices Deane and Gaudron, in a separate
judgment, argued that the original act of State that acquired sovereignty
and radical title to the lands of Australia did not indicate an intention to
also acquire beneficial ownership over unoccupied lands, thereby extin-
guishing Aboriginal title.21 Justice Toohey, in a separate opinion, agreed
with Justice Brennan that it was unacceptable that inhabited land could
be considered terra nullius2  His Honor thought, however, that if land
was in fact occupied, as was much of Australia, the common law protected
the indigenous rights of the occupiers.2" Justice Dawson alone dissented.
His Honor thought that under the common law it mattered not whether
land was acquired by conquest, cession or settlement if the sovereign
manifested an intention to acquire beneficial title to all lands.2 According
to Justice Dawson, nothing in the early history of Australia indicated any
intent on the part of the sovereign to recognize Aboriginal rights.2"
The Court was also divided on the implications that could be drawn
from the decision on the rights of the Crown to extinguish the Aboriginal
title thus recognized. Chief Justice Mason, and Justices Brennan, Dawson
and McHugh held that, absent a clear and unambiguous statutory provi-
sion to the contrary, the Crown could extinguish the Aboriginal title with-
16. Id. at 93 (Dawson, J.).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 26-9 (Brennan, J.).
19. Id. at 20.
20. Id. at 28-9.
21. Id. at 73 (Deane & Guadron, JJ.).
22. Id. at 142 (Toohey, J.).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 368 (Dawson, J.).
25. Id. at 368-9.
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out compensation. Justices Deane, Gaudron and Toohey held to the
contrary. 6
The case is important for what it has to say regarding the rights of
indigenous peoples generally, the concept of terra nullius, the doctrine of
intertemporal law, and the relationship of international law and munici-
pal law.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
27
The action was commenced in the High Court" in 1982 by the plain-
tiffs who are Murray Islanders. Each of the plaintiffs claimed specific par-
cels of land on the Murray Islands. They claimed to hold the land either
under traditional native title, or usufructuary rights over the land, or by
way of customary title. The plaintiffs did not deny the Crown's sover-
eignty over the Islands nor its radical title to the land, but argued that
the immemorial rights of the islanders had not been extinguished upon
the acquisition of sovereignty. To accept this proposition it was necessary
to find, first, that there were such pre-existing rights, which would not be
the case if the Islands were considered terra nullius, and second, that the
rights had not been extinguished by the Crown after annexation.
The Murray Islands of Mer, Dauar, and Waierlie lie at the eastern
end of the Torres Strait. They cover an area of nine square kilometers
and are occupied by the Meriam people, who are Melanesians and num-
ber no more than 1000. The Meriam people are gardeners living in small
villages. Their society was one regulated by customs, taboo, sorcery and
magic. European contact occurred initially at the end of the 18th century
and continued sporadically through to the middle of the 19th century. In
1877 the London Missionary Society established its headquarters on Mer.
The Imperial government in 1872 and 1875 passed the Pacific Islanders
Protection Acts2 9 in order to protect the islanders from blackbirders2 0
The 1875 Act expressly disavowed any territorial claims to the islands,
although the Queensland authorities did exercise some de facto control
over the islands in the 1870's. In 1879 the Queensland Legislature passed
the Queensland Coast Islands Act and the Governor of Queensland acting
under Letters Patent from the Crown, annexed the Murray Islands into
the Colony of Queensland. The Letters Patent used for the 1879 annexa-
tion, however, was ineffective because the Queensland Colony's bounda-
ries had been determined by Imperial legislation; it was therefore neces-
sary to annex the islands by Imperial legislation. This was accomplished
26. Id. at 7 (Mason, CJ. & McHugh, J.).
27. The facts of the case are taken from the judgment of Brennan J. Id. at 6-15.
28. Mabo v. Queensland (High Crt of Aust., Brisbane Office of the Registry, No. B12 of
1982). The case was remitted to the Queensland Supreme Court for a determination of facts.
29. 35 and 36 Vict. Acts c 19; 38 and 39 Viv c 51.
30. The term used for a person or vessel engaged in kidnapping blacks or Polynesians
for slavery.
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by the Colonial Boundaries Act of 1895 (Imp).31 In Wacando v. Common-
wealth82 the High Court rejected an argument that procedural discrepan-
cies had prevented the annexation of the Islands.
In 1985 the government of Queensland attempted to abort the Mabo
case with the Queensland Coast Islands Declaratory Act. This Act pur-
ported to declare retroactively that the intention of the Queensland Coast
Islands Act of 1879 was not only to acquire sovereignty, but also to extin-
guish native title, assuming such title existed. The Act was challenged in
Mabo v. Queensland"3 where a majority " of the High Court held that the
Act offended section 10(1) of the Commonwealth's Racial Discrimination
Act (1975) which makes ineffective legislation that prevents racial or eth-
nic groups from enjoying rights, as defined by Art. 5(d) of International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,-"
that are enjoyed by other racial or ethnic groups. 6 For the purposes of
the litigation, the High Court assumed that the rights claimed by the Me-
riam people existed, confining themselves to the issue of whether those
rights had been extinguished by the Queensland Coast Islands Declara-
tory Act.
Proceedings in the Queensland Supreme Court to determine the issue
of fact were finalized in November 1991 and the matter came once again
before the High Court. The various judgements of the Court cover some
170 pages. As is apparent from the, facts the Court could have confined
itself solely to the issue of the status of the Murray Islands. As Justice
Brennan stated:
This court can either apply the existing authorities and proceed to
inquire whether the Meriam people are higher "in the scale of social
organization" than the Australian Aboriginals whose claims were "ut-
terly disregarded" by the existing authorities or the court can overrule
the existing authorities, discarding the distinction between inhabited
colonies that were terra nullius and those which were not.3 7
The Meriam people are different from mainland Australian
Aboriginals in their social organization, culture, racial background and co-
31. 58 & 59 Vict. c 34.
32. Wacando v. Commonwealth, 148 C.L.R. 1 (1981).
33. Mabo v. Queensland, 63 A.L.J.R. 84 (1988).
34. Deane, Brennan, Toohey, and Gaudron, JJ. (Mason C.J., Dawson and Deane, JJ.
dissenting).
35. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
March 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
36. 10(1) If, by reason of, or of a provision of, a law of the Commonwealth or of a State
or Territory, a person of a particular race, color or national or ethnic origin do not enjoy a
right that is to be enjoyed by persons of another race, color or national or ethnic origin, or
enjoy a right to a more limited extent than persons of another race, color or national or
ethnic origin, then notwithstanding anything in that law, persons of the first mentioned
race, color or national or ethnic origin, shall by force of this section shall enjoy that right to
the same extent as persons of that other race, color or national or ethnic origin.
37. Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 27.
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lonial experience.38 Moreover, it could be argued that the 1872 and 1875
Pacific Islanders Protection Acts strongly suggest that the Islands were
not considered terra nullius by the British authorities. Commenting on
such treaties of protection in the Western Sahara case,3 9 Judge Hardy
Dillard noted, "you do not protect a terra nullius." All of the judgments
in Mabo, however, rejected the approach of confining the case to the sta-
tus of the Murray Islands. Justice Dawson agreed that the status of the
Murray Islands could not be determined without first establishing the in-
tention of the Crown with regard to New South Wales. The colony of
Queensland inherited the laws of New South Wales, and it was the laws
of Queensland that were introduced on the annexation of the Murray Is-
lands. It was, therefore, unnecessary to determine whether the Murray
Islands were conquered, ceded, or settled territory, as the Crown had ex-
pressly declared the law to be applied to Queensland and hence the Mur-
ray Islands on the occupation of New South Wales.40
A. The Occupation of Australia as Terra Nullius
Early international law writers were divided on the question whether
territory inhabited by indigenous peoples could be considered terra nul-
lius for the purpose of occupation. Francisco Vitoria,' Grotius,42 and
Blackstone 43 thought that occupied land could only be acquired by con-
quest or cession. Vattel" gave limited recognition of sovereignty to native
peoples while Hyde,45 Oppenheim 4s and Lindley 7 denied recognition of
sovereignty to those whom they classified as backward people. After an
extensive survey of relevant publicists Lindley concluded that:
[E]xtending over some three and a half centuries, there had been a
persistent preponderance of juristic opinion in favour of the proposi-
tion that lands in possession of any backward peoples who are politi-
cally organised ought not to be regarded as if they belonged to no one.
But that, and especially in comparatively modern times, a different
doctrine has been contended for and has numbered among its expo-
nents some well-known authorities; a doctrine which denies that In-
ternational Law recognizes any rights in primitive peoples to the terri-
38. See Beckett, Ownership of Land in the Torres Strait Islands, in ABORIGINES, LAND
AND LAND RIGHTS 202-206 (Nicolas Peterson & Marcia Langton eds., 1983).
39. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 124.
40. 107 A.L.R. at 106.
41. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IvRE BELLI RELECIONES 127-28 (J. Bates
trans., 1917)(1964).
42. 2 HUGO GROTIUs, DE JuRE BELLI Ac PACiS LIBRi TRES 550 (F. Kelsey trans., 1925).
43. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 107-8.
44. 3 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW
85 (Charles Fenwick trans., 1964).
45. 1 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED
BY THE UNITED STATES 175 (1922).
46. LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 383-84 (3d ed. 1920).
47. MARK FRANK LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (1926).
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tory they inhabit, and, in its most advanced form, demands that such
peoples shall have progressed so far in civilization as to have become
recognized as members of the Family of Nations before they can be
allowed such rights.'8
John Westlake argued in 1910 that because indigenous societies were
unable to supply a government suitable for the protection of white men
they could not be given international status.4
9
International Tribunal Awards in the 1920s and 1930s similarly did
not recognize indigenous territorial rights.50 Even when the land was
ceded or conquered and there was a treaty between the indigenous peo-
ples and the colonial power, the treaty had little impact in international
law. Max Huber in the Islands of Palmas case said of such treaties that,
"they are not in the international law sense, treaties or conventions capa-
ble of creating rights and obligations." 51
It was not until 1975 in the Western Sahara case that an interna-
tional tribunal raised doubts about the question whether land occupied
by indigenous people could be considered terra nullius. Vice President
Ammoun in his Separate Opinion considered that the concept of terra
nullius had been employed at all periods to justify conquest and coloniza-
tion and as such stood condemned.5 ' The majority thought, however, that
territory was not terra nullius if it were occupied by peoples having "so-
cial and political organization.""3 This seems to suggest that the Court
considered that there might be territory where the inhabitants do not
have such organization and as such is terra nullius.
The history of the concept of terra nullius and indeed the Western
Sahara case itself illustrates a continuing conflict between lofty ideals
and the practical reality of greed and acquisition. It is an irony that the
Court's Opinion in the Western Sahara case, on which Justice Brennan
relies, that the peoples of the Western Sahara were entitled to self-deter-
mination was ignored by Morocco and Mauritania, who divided the area
between themselves.84
The early history of Australia shows a similar conflict between the
48. Id. at 20.
49. J. WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 141-143 (1920).
50. Legal Status of E. Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53; Islands
of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (1928); Cayuga Indians (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), 6
R.I.A.A. 173 (1926).
51. Islands of Palmas Case, 2 R.I.A.A. at 858. He did not think, however, that they were
totally without effect internationally in that fulfillment of the obligation may be a basis for
determining whether the colonial power was exercising suzerainty for the purposes of recog-
nition of sovereignty by other states. This point will be returned to later in the text.
52. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 86.
53. Id. at 39.
54. In 1978 Mauritania formally renounced its claims to the Western Sahara and the
entire area was taken over by Morocco. For a general account of the conflict, see J. DAMIS,
CONFLICT IN NORTH-WEST AFRICA: THE WESTERN SAHARA DIsPUTE (1983). See also Franck,
The Stealing of the Sahara, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 694 (1976).
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pious hopes of high government officials and the actual practices of the
settlers. Captain Cook, when he visited the east coast of Australia in 1768,
was given instructions to show the natives, "every kind of civility and
regard [and] . . . also with the consent of the natives to take possession
of convenient situations in the country."55 Arthur Phillips, when he was
commissioned to sail the first fleet to Botany Bay, was instructed to treat
the natives with kindness and punish those who unnecessarily interrupted
them in their occupations. He was also commissioned to grant away lands
that were in the Crown's power to dispose of. No direct mention was
made, however, of Aboriginal land rights. 6 As late as 1839 Lord Russell
at the colonial office wrote in a despatch to Governor Gipps in Australia,
"it is impossible that the Government should forget that the original ag-
gression was our own, and that we have never yet performed the sacred
duty . . . to impart to the former occupiers of New South Wales the
blessings of Christianity, or the knowledge of the Arts and advantages of
civilized life. 5 7
Although he found inhabitants, Cook did not seek nor obtain their
consent when he claimed possession of half the Australian continent in
1770."8 After this there followed a period of dispossession, conflict and
extermination." The statement of Mr. Lesina, the Member of Parliament
for Clermon in Queensland in 1901, reflected a typical view at the turn of
the century:
I do not think there is any necessity why we should step out of our
way to preserve the aboriginal population ... the aboriginal popula-
tion of this country must eventually disappear entirely. . . . The law
of evolution says that [they]... shall disappear in the onward pro-
gress of the white man.60
Under these circumstances the High Court in Mabo was faced with a
monumental task in logically holding that Australia w'as not viewed as
terra nullius when first occupied and moreover, that aboriginal rights
continue to subsist.
Justice Brennan thought that if the Crown did have exclusive owner-
ship of all the land in Australia it would mean that the common law ex-
tinguished the land rights of the indigenous people on the first settlement
thereby exposing them to:
deprivation of the religious, cultural and economic sustenance which
55. Secret Instruction Book of the British Admiralty in JOHN BENNETT & ALEX
CASTLES, AN AUSTRALIAN LEGAL HISTORY 253-254 (1982)(hereinafter BENNETT & CASTLES].
56. 1 BARTON, HISTORY OF NEW SOUTH WALES FROM THE RECORDS 483 (1989).
57. Despatch No. 62 Lord Russell to Gipps, 21 Dec. 1839 [H.R.A., (1924), i20.439, at
440], cited in Mabo v. Queensland, 107 A.L.R. 1, 108 (Dawson, J.).
58. BENNETT AND CASTLES, supra note 55.
59. HENRY REYNOLDS, THE OTHER SIDE OF THE FRONTIER 64-95 (1981); ROBERTS, supra
note 2, at 13-19.
60. Quoted in ABORIGINAL LAND RIGHTS :A HANDBOOK 109 (Nicolas Peterson ed., 1981).
See also REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at ch. 4.
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the land provides, vested the land effectively in the control of the Im-
perial authorities without any right to compensation and made the
indigenous inhabitants intruders in their own homes and mendicants
for a place to live. Judged by civilized standard, such law is unjust
and its claim to be part of the common law to be applied in contem-
porary Australia must be questioned.0'
While accepting that acquisition of territory by a state for the first
time cannot be challenged in the courts, Justice Brennan thought that
the courts could determine the consequences of acquisition of sovereignty
under local law; that the courts could determine the body of law that is in
force in the new territory. This depended on the manner of its acquisi-
tion. How a state acquired territory was governed by international law.
The common law, in accordance with the manner of acquisition, deter-
mined the body of law that applied in the new territory.
His Honor considered acquisition of territory by way of the enlarged
doctrine of terra nullius: namely, that states could acquire territory by
discovery and occupation, although the territory had an indigenous popu-
lation provided that the Aboriginal inhabitants were not organised in a
society that was united for political action. The enlarged doctrine of terra
nullius, however, created problems in determining what law was to be
applied to an occupied territory. Blackstone," for example, was unable to
declare any rule by which the common law became part of territory ac-
quired by occupation that was not uninhabited. Justice Brennan there-
fore, came to the conclusion:
It is one thing for our contemporary law to accept that the laws of
England ... became the laws of (Australia). . . . It is another thing
for our contemporary law to accept that when the common law of
England became the common law of the several colonies, the theory
which was advanced to support the introduction of the common law of
England accords with our present knowledge and appreciation of the
facts.. . . The facts as we know them today do not fit the 'absence of
law' or 'barbarian' theory underpinning the colonial reception of the
common law of England. That being so, there is no warrant for apply-
ing in these times rules of the English common law which were the
product of that theory.63
His Honor then considered the status of the enlarged theory of terra nul-
lius in international law. Referring to the Western Sahara Opinion, par-
ticularly that of Vice President Ammoun, he concluded that the enlarged
notion of terra nullius no longer commanded general acceptance. " It fol-
lowed from this that
[i]f the international law notion that inhabited land may be classified
as terra nullius no longer commands' general support, the doctrines of
61. 107 A.L.R. at 18 (Brennan, J.).
62. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 107.
63. 107 A.L.R. at 26 (Brennan, J.).
64. Id. at 28.
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the common law which depend on the notion that native peoples may
be "so low in the scale of social organization" that it is 'idle to impute
to such people some shadow of the rights known to our law" can
hardly be retained. If it were permissible in the past centuries to keep
the common law in step with international law, it is imperative in to-
day's world that the common law should neither be nor be seen to be
frozen in an age of racial discrimination. . . . The common law does
not necessarily conform with international law, but international law
is a legitimate and important influence on the development of the
common law, especially when international law declares the existence
of universal human rights.65
Thus Justice Brennan's reasoning is, first, that a law based on mistaken
facts should have no application if it leads to racial discrimination and,
second, that as international law no longer accepts the enlarged doctrine
of terra nullius, the current doctrine should be applied in order to protect
indigenous human rights. This second proposition appears to apply the
international law doctrine of intertemporal law to the law of Australia.
In the Islands of Palmas case66 Max Huber considered that for occu-
pation to be effective the Sovereign had not only to show that sovereignty
was acquired in accordance with international law, but also that it was
maintained in accordance with developing international law. 7 Justice
Brennan does not question the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty. How-
ever, the rejection of the expanded concept of terra nullius has, for prac-
tical purposes, diminished what would have been the entitlements of the
Crown under what was thought to be the international and common law
at the time of occupation. As this is achieved by incorporation of contem-
porary international law standards into Australian domestic law, two
questions can be asked: Is the standard applied by Justice Brennan in
fact the contemporary standard? Second, would international- law apply
the contemporary standard of terra nullius? In other words is intertem-
poral law applicable in this situation?
Insofar as the first question is concerned, it is not at all clear that the
Western Sahara case rejects the expanded notion of terra nullius as part
of current international law. The Court, in its Advisory Opinion, seems to
adopt an evaluative test in determining whether the nomadic tribes of the
Western Sahara satisfied the relevant test. The Court concluded, "[iln
the present instance ... at the time of colonization Western Sahara was
inhabited by peoples which, if nomadic, were socially and politically or-
ganized in tribes and under chiefs competent to represent them."6 Jus-
tice Brennan rejects any test of social or political evaluation as being ra-
cially prejudicial and as such inconsistent with international law. His
position accords with that of Vice President Ammoun, who would have
65. Id.
66. Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. 829.
67. Id. at 839.
68. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 39 (Emphasis added).
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excluded from the concept of terra nullius any inhabited territory. 9
The Western Sahara case was decided in 1975. Since the 70's, how-
ever, numerous declarations,7 0 studies,7' working groups, 2 and state poli-
cies dealing with indigenous concerns73 suggest that an indigenous norm
is in the process of emerging for the protection of indigenous rights, in-
cluding land rights. One focus of this norm relates to the classification of
territory occupied by indigenous people as terra nullius. The Indigenous
Nongovernmental Organizations submitted to the Working Group on In-
digenous Populations Fifth Session a draft declaration asserting that,
"[d]iscovery, conquest, settlement on a theory of terra nullius and unilat-
eral legislation are never legitimate bases for States to claim or retain the
territories of indigenous nations or peoples."'
4
While one might say that a norm is emerging regarding indigenous
peoples' land rights and an aspect of this norm is the rejection of the
enlarged doctrine of terra nullius, can one say that it has emerged so as
to reject the expanded notion of terra nullius? In the development of
international law there is that shadowy period when non obligatory state
69. Id. at 86. It should be noted that some of the judges expressed doubts concerning
the relevance of the terra nullius question to the case in that none of the involved parties
had claimed that the Western Sahara was terra nullius. See id. at 74-75 (Gros, J.); 113
(Petren, J.); 123 (Dillard, J.).
70. See Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations: Re-
port of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minori-
ties, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/476/Add.4 (1981): Resolutions of the Inuit Circumpolar Con-
ference, Annex 1; the Draft Declaration of Principles for the Defense of the Indigenous
Nations and Peoples of the Western Hemisphere prepared by the International Non-Gov-
ernmental Organizations Conference on the Discrimination against Indigenous Populations,
Annex IV; Resolutions of the First Congress of the Indian Movements of South America,
Annex V; Conclusions and Recommendations Regarding the Rights of Indigenous People by
the Seminar on Human Rights in Rural Areas of the Andean Region, Annex VI; Recommen-
dations of the Forth Russell Tribunal on the Rights of the Indians of the Americas, Annex
VII. The San Jose Declaration of 1981, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against
Indigenous Populations: Report of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/21/Add.3, 25 (1983). The Decla-
ration of Principles Adopted by Indigenous Peoples at a prepatory meeting in Geneva, Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Study of the
Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, Report of the Working Group
on Indigenous Populations in its Fifth Session, 39th Sess., Agenda Item 10, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/22 Annex V (1987). U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, First Re-
vised Text of the Draft Universal Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/33 (1989).
71. See Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations,
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/7 Add. 1-4 (1986); see also ROXANNE ORTIZ, INDIANS OF THE AMERICAS (1984).
72. In 1982 the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities established the Working Group on Indigenous Populations.
73. See generally Torres, supra note 2.
74. INDIAN LAW RESOURCE CENTER ET AL., DRAFT DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, reprinted
in Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Fourth Session, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/22 Add.1 (1985).
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practice becomes a binding rule of international law. In this process mu-
nicipal courts have an important role to play; perhaps an even greater
role than the international tribunals. Somewhere along the line an indica-
tion of the obligatory nature of the rule must be established. Without
action at this crucial stage international law cannot advance. Lord Justice
Nourse in the Tin Council case7 5 articulated the appropriate course for a
municipal court where an international rule had not solidified:
An uncertain question of international law is one which cannot be set-
tled by reference either to an opinion of the International Court of
Justice or to some usage, custom or general principle of law recognized
by all civilized nations. The authorities show that where it is neces-
sary for an English court to decide such a question... [it] must do so;
being guided by municipal legislation and judicial decisions, treaties
and conventions and the opinions of international jurists; and, where
no consensus is there found by those opinions which are most nearly
consistent with reason and justice.71
This dynamic role is imperative in matters involving human rights.
This is because the claimants often have no means of bringing their cases
before international tribunals or forums where the existence of a norm of
international law may be established. In such situations it is the munici-
pal courts who must bear the burden of articulating the norm of interna-
tional law. Moreover, in the case of indigenous peoples' rights, the courts
of a state with a large indigenous population, such as Australia, have a
particular obligation to articulate the international standard concerning
such people.7
In determining the second question, whether intertemporal law
would apply, the decision of the Court in the Western Sahara case is of
little help. The Court there considered itself bound by the question put
to it by the General Assembly to decide the terra nullius question accord-
ing to the law in force at the time of colonization. 8 Justice Brennan's
intertemporal approach, however, does find support in the separate opin-
ions of Judges De Castro and Forester. De Castro argued that changes to
facts and changes to law could not be ignored in the Western Sahara
case: 7 9 "whatever the existing legal ties with the territory may have been
at the time of colonization by Spain, legally those ties remain subject to
intertemporal law. . ... 80s Judge Forster similarly thought that the Opin-
75. Maclaine Watson & Co. v. Dept. of Trade, [19881 3 W.L.R. 1033.
76. Id. at 107.
77. As De Visscher has said of the development of customary international law;
"Among the users are always some who mark the soil more deeply with their footprints than
others, either because of their weight . . . or because their interests bring them more fre-
quently this way." CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAw 155 (1960).
78. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 38-9.
79. Id. at 169 (DeCastro, J.).
80. Id. at 171. Judge De Castro believed that the issue of terra nullius and existing ties
should have been considered independently.
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ion of the Court minimized, "the social and temporal context of the prob-
lem." ' Philip Jessup, commenting on Huber's conception of intertem-
poral law, found it "highly disturbing" that a state's title to territory
might be affected by the development of international morality. "Every
state would constantly be under the necessity of examining its title to
each portion of its territory in order to determine whether a change in the
law had necessitated, as it were, a re-acquisition." 82 Jessup was concerned
about a state losing its sovereignty over territory by virtue of a new rule
of international law. This is clearly not the situation here. The doctrine,
however, is of general application to customary international law and is
not confined solely to the acquisition of territory.8
Brownlie8 ' and other writers85 have pointed out that the concern ex-
pressed by Jessup, while correct in theory, rarely has a practical effect.
This is because the doctrines of acquiescence, prescription and desuetude
will limit its application. Also, "inter-temporal law has never been applied
where a change in the law has come about in a short time."8 6 With regard
to this latter point it can be said that, from the time of the writings of
Vitoria and Blackstone, the extended doctrine of terra nullius has been
questioned. Certainly since 1945, when the protection of indigenous peo-
ples has been more prominently on the political agenda, acquisition by
way of the extended doctrine has been under attack. With particular re-
gard to Australia, the despatch of Lord Russell to Governor Gipps87 indi-
cated an awareness of the wrong done to the indigenous people of Austra-
lia and, as one does not perform acts of aggression against terra nullius, it
seems relatively clear that since 1839 the idea that Australia was acquired
as terra nullius8 8 was a fiction. This is illustrated by the fact that the idea
that Australia was settled as terra nullius was challenged in the Austra-
lian courts as early as 1836.89 Under these circumstances it can hardly be
said that the abandonment of the extended doctrine terra nullius oc-
curred within a short time. Therefore, it seems that under the circum-
stances international law would call for the application of intertemporal
law in the application of the terra nutlius doctrine insofar as it relates to
the rights of indigenous peoples.
One final question relating to this aspect of Justice Brennan's judg-
ment is the applicability of intertemporal law to municipal systems. This
81. Id. at 103 (Forster, J.).
82. Philip Jessup, The Island of Palmas Arbitration, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 735 (1928). See
also R. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (1963); W.
VERFELT, THE MIANGAS ARBITRATION 14, 149 (1933).
83. T.O. Elias, The Doctrine of Intertemporal Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 285 (1980)[here-
inafter Elias].
84. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 132 (1973).
85. Elias, supra note 83, at 286-287.
86. A. ROCHE, THE MINQUIERS AND ECREHOS CASE 83 (1959).
87. See text accompanying note 57.
88. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 124.
89. R. v. Murrell (1836) Legge 72.
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was raised indirectly in the United States,90 the United Kingdom and
the Federal Republic of Germany9 in cases involving the applicability of
the absolute theory of sovereign immunity as opposed to the more re-
cently developed restrictive theory. In each case the court indicated that
it would apply the current rule of international law although, in the com-
mon law jurisdictions, there was prior authority adopting the absolute
theory into their law.
While Justice Brennan supported his decision with the incorporation
of contemporary international law standards of terra nullius into Austra-
lian law, Justices Deane and Gaudron in their separate opinion, adopt an
approach more in line with the first strand of Justice Brennan's opinion.
They agreed that the acquisition of sovereignty was unchallengeable in
the municipal courts and also that the common law determined the law
applicable after acquisition; and, referring to United Kingdom author-
ity," they concluded that the common law of the time did recognize in-
digenous title if the territory was occupied. Then after reviewing the his-
torical data they conclude that the act of State establishing sovereignty
over Australia indicated nothing more than an intention to assert radical
title to land in Australia:
[I]t seems to us to be simply not arguable that there was anything in
the act of State establishing the Colony which constituted either an
expropriation or extinguishment of any existing native interests in the
vast areas of land in the new Colony or a negation or reversal of the
strong assumption of the common law that such native interests were
respected and protected under the law .... 94
Their Honors explain the absence of any specific reference to Aboriginal
title in the early documents on the basis that because of a lack of infor-
mation regarding the inhabitants generally,
it was simply assumed either that the land needs of the penal estab-
lishment could be satisfied without impairing any existing interests (if
there were any) of the Aboriginal inhabitants in specific land or that
any difficulties which did arise could be resolved on the spot with the
assent or acquiescence of the Aboriginals.9"
While subsequent acts of dispossession might explain an ambiguity in the
original claim to sovereignty, subsequent acts could not do so when, as in
the case of the Australian settlement, there was no ambiguity regarding
the relevant act of State.96
90. Alfred Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
91. Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 2 W.L.R. 356, reprinted
in 16 I.L.M. 471 (1977).
92. Nonresident Petitioner v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 16 I.L.M. 501 (1977).
93. Attorney-General for Quebec v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1921] 1 App. Cas.
408; Amodu Tijani, [1921] 2 App. Cas. 409, 410.
94. Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 73.
95. Id. at 74.
96. Id.
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Justice Toohey in his separate opinion adopted a slightly different
approach. He agreed with Justice Brennan that it was unacceptable that
land which is in regular occupation should be regarded as terra nullius.9 7
However, His Honor thought that the doctrine of terra nullius had no
application to the case. He argued that because the land was in fact occu-
pied by the Aboriginal people when the Crown obtained sovereignty, the
Crown could only obtain radical title to occupied land, this regardless of
any intentions it mights have had to the contrary:
Immediately on acquisition indigenous inhabitants became British
subjects whose interests were to be protected in the case of a settled
colony by the immediate operation of the common law. The Crown
did not acquire a proprietary title to any territory except that truly
uninhabited.98
These aspects of the judgements are concerned with interpreting histori-
cal data by way of present mores and information concerning indigenous
people. The International Court in the Western Sahara case in deciding
the status of the territory at the time of occupation took a similar ap-
proach and was able to look at information regarding the Western Sa-
hara's legal status and legal ties at other times, if this shed light on the
initial occupation.9
Justices Deane and Gaudron, in their judgment, suggest that if the
Crown officers had been aware of the numbers of Aboriginals on the Aus-
tralian continent, and the sophistication of their culture and social organ-
ization, they would not have considered the territory terra nullius. As
they had no such information, and as there was a strong common law
presumption protecting indigenous title, the act of State acquiring sover-
eignty only extended to the extent of acquiring radical title. The content
of the Sovereign's intention is therefore supplied with hindsight based on
accurate information as to Aboriginals and their society.
Justice Toohey's position was that the Sovereign's intention at the
time was irrelevant if the land was in fact occupied. He then employed
current information regarding Aboriginals and their relationship to the
land to show that the land was in fact occupied on settlement and there-
fore protected by the common law.
Justice Dawson dissented. He thought that the issue of whether terri-
tory is classified as ceded, conquered, or settled was irrelevant for munici-
pal law purposes where the new law which is introduced is expressly de-
clared by the new Sovereign." 0 In Australia, the sovereign had no
intention to preserve Aboriginal title:
97. Id. at 142. His honor also thought that the idea that land which was not in regular
occupation was terra nullius needed great scrutiny. The failure of people to remain in one
spot may be due to the harshness of the climate rather than a lack of attachment to the
land. Id. at 141.
98. Id. at 142.
99. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 38.
100. 107 A.L.R. at 106 (citing Cooper v. Stuart, [18891 14 App. Cas. 286, 291).
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Upon any account, the policy which was implemented and the laws
which were passed in New South Wales make it plain that, from the
inception of the colony, the Crown treated all land in the colony as
unoccupied and afforded no recognition to any form of native interest
in the land. It simply treated the land as its own to dispose of without
regard to such interests as the natives might have had prior to the
assumption of sovereignty. What was done was quite inconsistent with
any recognition, by acquiescence or otherwise, of native title. 101
After considering the historical data, including the early instructions to
governors, the dispossession of the Aboriginal people of their land, and
the creation of reservations, His Honor concluded:
[T]here may not be a great deal to be proud of in this history of
events. But a dispassionate appraisal of what occurred is essential to
the determination of the legal consequences, notwithstanding the de-
gree of condemnation which is nowadays apt to accompany any ac-
count. The policy which lay behind the legal regime was determined
politically and, however insensitive the politics may now seem to have
been, a change in view does not of itself mean a change in the law. It
requires the implementation of a new policy to do that and that is a
matter for government rather than the courts. In the meantime it
would be wrong to attempt to revise history or to fail to recognize its
legal impact, however unpalatable it may now seem. To do so would
be to impugn the foundations of the very legal system under which
this case must be decided.102
In this regard Justice Dawson agrees with Justice Brennan in that the
actual intention of the Sovereign on occupation was to claim all beneficial
ownership of the land in Australia. The difference is that Brennan simply
would not give effect to such an intention based as it was on incorrect
information. As the relevant intention is colored with the knowledge or
lack thereof of Aboriginal culture and numbers together with racial
prejudices prevalent at the time, it is relatively clear that the Crown did
intend to occupy the Australian continent as terra nullius. The intent is
manifest if one compares the instructions of Lord Normanby, the Secre-
tary of State for War and the Colonies, to Captain Hobson, the Crown
negotiator with the New Zealand Maori people - a territory not consid-
ered terra nullius - with those of the Crown officers occupying New
South Wales:
[The Crown] disclaims . . . every pretension to seize on the Island of
New Zealand, or to govern them as part of the Dominion of Great
Britain, unless free and intelligent consent of the Natives, expressed
according to their established usages, shall be first obtained .... All
dealings with the Aborigines for their Lands must be conducted on
the same principles of sincerity, justice, and good faith as must govern
101. Id. at 106-7.
102. Id. at 111. For an account of legislative attempts to reject the terra nullius applica-
tion to Australia, see Andree Lawrey, Contemporary Efforts to Guarantee Indigenous
Rights Under International Law, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 703, 743 (1990).
VOL. 21:2
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' RIGHTS
your transactions with them for the recognition of Her Majesty's Sov-
ereignty of the Islands .... The acquisition of Land by the Crown for
future settlement . . . must be confined to such Districts as the Na-
tives can alienate without distress or serious inconvenience to
themselves." 3
In holding that the intention at the time of settlement was not to occupy
as terra nullius Justices Deane and Gaudron were able to further hold
that the present indigenous rights were not extinguishable by the Crown
without compensatory damages. Justice Toohey reached the same conclu-
sion by a different route. The majority, however, thought that Crown
could extinguish the native title. This raises the question of whether
Mabo is yet another instance of "Indian giving". One more empty prom-
ise. To answer this it is necessary to consider the nature of the interest
recognized and the extent to which it can be protected.
B. The Implications of Mabo
1. The Nature of Indigenous Title
In determining whether the Aboriginal people retained presettlement
rights and interests in their land, Justice Brennan thought that the court
could adopt contemporary notions of justice and human rights if in so
doing it did not fracture the skeleton of principles which gave the com-
mon law its shape and consistency. '0 By this His Honor apparently
meant the recognition of the indigenous interest might run afoul of an
essential doctrine of the common law. An essential doctrine in part being
indicated by whether, if a rule were to be overturned, the disturbance to
the law would disproportionate to the benefit achieved. 05
His Honor considered the doctrine of tenure to be an essential doc-
trine of the common law. 0 6 Recognizing that the Crown only acquired
radical title in the land, so that beneficial ownership lay with the indige-
nous title holders, would not fracture the tenure doctrine. The recogni-
tion of radical title in the Crown was quite consistent with the recognition
of native title to land, radical title was necessary for when the Crown
exercised its sovereign power to grant or to appropriate land within its
territory. Unless this sovereign power is exercised in one of these ways
there was no reason why land within the Crown's territory should not
continue to be subject to native title.10 7
It was only by fastening on the notion that a settled colony was terra
nullius that it was possible to predicate of the Crown the acquisition
103. Normanby to Hobson, 14 Aug. 1839, CO 2091/, 251-81. See also SPEECHES AND
DOCUMENTS ON NEW ZEALAND HISTORY 10 (William David McIntyre & W.J. Gardner eds.,
1971).
104. 107 A.L.R. at 29.
105. Id. at 19.
106. Id. at 31.
107. Id. at 35-6.
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of ownership of land in a colony already occupied by indigenous in-
habitants. It was only on the hypothesis that there was nobody in oc-
cupation that it could be said that the Crown was the owner because
there was no other. If that hypothesis be rejected, the notion that sov-
ereignty carried ownership in its wake must be rejected too.'08
In Milirripum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd.,10 9 Justice Blackburn of the Supreme
Court of the Northern Territory had held that the Aboriginal relationship
with their land was not of a proprietary nature. This was because, while
the Aboriginals felt that they had obligations towards the land, it was not
an economic relationship whereby they could exclude others or alienate
the land. 10 Justice Brennan thought Aboriginal title constituted a propri-
etary interest when it was possessed by a community that was in exclu-
sive possession of land. It did not matter whether or not the land be-
longed to individuals in the community so long as the community
effectively asserted that none but its members had the right of occupancy
or use of the land. Justice Brennan rejected the view in Milirripum that
alienability was an essential indicia of a proprietary interest. The fact
that individual members of a group enjoyed usufructuary rights over land
did not mean that the Aboriginal community or group did not have a
proprietary interest, which was a burden on the radical title of the
Crown."'
The Aboriginal title, which survived the past 200 years were those
where the clan or group had continued to observe, as far as practicable,
the laws and customs based on the traditions of the group so that the
connection with the land was maintained."' If the clan or group no longer
practiced the customs, then the foundation of the native title had been
abandoned, and could not be revived. Full title had vested in the
Crown."'
Insofar as alienability was concerned Aboriginal title could not be ac-
quired from an indigenous people by one who not being indigenous could
not acknowledge their laws and customs. Similarly, a right or interest
cannot be acquired by a clan or group or member of an indigenous people
unless the acquisition is consistent with the laws and customs of the peo-
ple. Only the Crown can acquire hative interest outside the laws and cus-
toms of the indigenous people, it being an incident of sovereignty that the
Crown alone can accept the surrender of native title.' 14
The rights and interests recognized will be protected by the appro-
priate legal and equitable remedies of the common law and established by
the evidence as to whether the right is proprietary or personal and usu-
108. Id. at 31.
109. Milirripum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd., 17 F.L.R. 141 (1971).
110. Id. at 270-73.
111. Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 36.
112. Id. at 42.
113. Id. at 43.
114. Id.
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fructuary; and whether it is possessed by community, group or
individual. " 5
Justices Deane and Gaudron adopted a similar approach. They de-
fined native title as being one where the interest under the local law or
custom involved "an established entitlement of an identified community,
group or [rarely] individual to the occupation or use of particular land
and that entitlement. . . be of sufficient significance to establish a locally
recognized [interest] between the particular community, group or individ-
ual and that land."'1 6 The entitlement may be one that correlates to com-
mon law notions of ownership, possession and property or it may not. If it
does not correlate with a common law interest then it may either be
transformed into an interest recognized by the common law or the com-
mon law may be modified so as to accommodate the new interest."7
Whatever the nature of the entitlement, however, it is a personal in-
terest and not a legal or beneficial interest or estate in the land. Following
from this it cannot be alienated outside of the native system except to the
Crown; and it may be extinguished by a grant or other dealing with the
land that was inconsistent with the common law native title."8 As per-
sonal rights they can be extinguished by surrender to the Crown or may
be lost by the abandonment of the connection with the land. Their Hon-
ors were not prepared to decide whether the interest would be lost by
abandonment of the traditional customs and ways of the group. Their
present feeling is that occupancy and use of the land sufficient to main-
tain the interest."9
Justice Toohey took the most radical approach to the nature of the
indigenous title, starting from the premise that it is the presence of the
indigenous people on the land that prevents the Crown from acquiring
beneficial title. It follows from this that presence would be insufficient to
establish title if it were coincidental or truly random, "having no connec-
tion with or meaning in relation to a society's economic, cultural or reli-
gious life." The use of the land must be meaningful as understood from
the perspective of the society. 20 Referring to Sac and Fox Indian Tribes
v. United States,' and Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Af-
fairs, '2 His Honor thought that the proof of occupancy should be by ref-
erence to the demands of the land and the society in question.'23 He did
not think, however, that anything more than established occupancy at
115. Id. at 44.
116. Id. at 64.
117. Id. at 65-6.
118. Id. at 66.
119. Id. at 83.
120. Id. at 146.
121. Sac and Fox Indian Tribes v. United States, 383 F.2d 991, 998 (1967).
122. Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs, 107 D.L.R.3d 513, 544-45
(1979).123. 107 A.L.R. at 147.
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time of annexation was needed. His Honor did not see why "long prior"
occupancy was necessary. 2 ' Nor was it necessary that occupancy be ex-
clusive,' 29 except insofar as was necessary to preclude indiscriminate
ranging over land as a basis of title. If more than one band occupied the
land each small group could be said to have title or it was vested in the
larger society. 2 ' His Honor also thought that the inalienability of native
title was open to question, and the characterization of native title as per-
sonal rather than proprietary, "fruitless" and "unnecessarily complex.1
27
Justice Toohey thought that there was power in the Crown to extinguish
traditional title, but there is some authority that suggests consent is
required.128
Justice Dawson, in his dissent, acknowledged that the annexation of
land did not bring to an end those rights which the Crown in the exercise
of its sovereignty chooses to recognize.' 9 His Honor thought that the in-
digenous interest need not correspond with common law notions of prop-
erty. 3 0 The critical question for Justice Dawson was whether the Crown
had accepted the indigenous title either expressly or impliedly. This was
because once the Crown assumed radical title pre-existing title was held
under the Crown and the Crown must accept that title."'
The judgments of the Court in Mabo advance the status of indige-
nous title in Australia to the extent that they now recognize that Aborigi-
nal interests in land need not correspond with common law concepts of
ownership. The extinguishment of Aboriginal interests by an assumed
abandonment because of an absence from the land or the dismemberment
of the group is inappropriate. First, it assumes that the connection with
the land is primarily a physical one. Aboriginals may not have lived on
their lands for years perhaps generations yet continue to have spiritual
links with the land and its sacred sites. Also they may have been absent
from their land due to misrepresentations, false promises and violence.
The abandonment doctrine may ultimately protect only that land which
the white settlers considered insufficiently valuable to be worth the effort
of driving off the Aboriginal people, while at the same time disenfranchis-
ing those who are the most oppressed.
The restriction on alienability may be less significant than it appears.
The indigenous title holders presumably can relinquish their title to the
Crown in return for a grant back of the land in fee simple. Moreover, the
124. Id. at 147-8. This was required in Hamlet of Baker Lake, 107 D.L.R.3d at 546.
125. Id. at 148 (citing United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 345
(1941)).
126. Id. at 48.
127. Id. at 151-2.
128. Id. at 151 (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 350, 370 (1832)(the crown's title
comprised, "the exclusive right of purchasing such lands as the natives were willing to sell").
129. Id. at 93-4.
130. Id. at 97.
131. Id. at 98-9.
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right to exclude ordinarily includes the right to include. It would follow
that the title holders could grant leases and licenses to their lands, but
cannot alienate it completely. The inalienability of traditional title is a
significant feature of the claims of indigenous people. The World Council
of Indigenous Peoples identified as one of their irrevocable and inborn
rights "inalienable, collective land ownership." '132
2. The Crown's Power to Extinguish Indigenous Title
The defendant in Mabo argued that under the common law, pre-ex-
isting customary rights were extinguished unless expressly recognized by
the Crown." 3 Justice Brennan considered the preferable rule to be that a
change in sovereignty did not extinguish native title,'" and that the in-
digenous inhabitants Were in the same position as inhabitants of a con-
quered territory. In so holding, the Court overruled long standing author-
ity to the contrary. This was necessary to prevent the continued
discrimination against the Aboriginal people. Moreover, it also accorded
with the reality of Australian history. The acquisition of sovereignty did
not encompass beneficial ownership of the land. The Aboriginals were not
dispossessed of their lands by such acquisition, but rather by recurrent
exercises of paramount power to exclude the indigenous inhabitants from
their lands as the colonies expanded. " '
The acquisition of sovereignty, however, carried with it the power to
create and extinguish private rights in the land. The courts could not re-
view the merit of an extinguishment, only its legality. Following United
States" 6 and Canadian 3 7 authority, the exercise of the power must reveal
a clear and plain intention to do so. Such an intention is not revealed by
a law which merely regulates the enjoyment of title. Similarly, a law
which reserves land from sale for the purpose of permitting the indige-
nous to enjoy the native title does not work an extinguishment." 8
Justices Deane and Gaudron rejected the notion that native title was
no more than permissive occupancy which the Crown was lawfully enti-
tled to revoke or terminate regardless of the wishes of those living on the
land. 3 9 This would give the indigenous people no real security as they
132. Special General Assembly of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples: Declara-
tions and Resolution, reproduced in Cobo Report, supra note 3.
133. 107 A.L.R. at 38 (citing Secretary of State for India v. Bai Rajbai, 42 I.A. 229
(1915); Vajesingji Joravarsingji v. Secretary of State for India, 51 I.A. 357 (1924); Secretary
of State for India v. Sardar Rustam Khan, I.A. 356 (1941)).
134. 107 A.L.R. at 41.
135. Id.
136. United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 353 (1941); Lipan Apache
Tribe v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 487 (1967).
137. Calder v. A.G. of British Columbia, 34 D.L.R.3d 145, 210 (1973); Hamlet of Baker
Lake v. Minister of Foreign Affairs, 107 D.L.R.3d 513 (1979); Reg. v. Sparrow, 70 D.L.R.4th
385 (1990).
138. 107 A.L.R. at 48.
139. Id. at 67-68.
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could be dispossessed at the whim of the executive.' 0 Their Honors
thought that if the Crown wrongfully extinguished native title it would be
obliged to pay compensation."' As native title constitutes a legal right,
the Commonwealth would be obliged to provide just terms for any acqui-
sition. The Racial Discrimination Act also restrains the States and Terri-
tories from extinguishing or diminishing Aboriginal title.'4 2
Justice Toohey thought that the Crown had the power to extinguish
native title by clear and plain legislation.' 4 3 His Honor, however, thought
that there exists a fiduciary duty to ensure that traditional title was not
impaired or destroyed without the consent or against the interests of the
title holders.'4 4  Otherwise the title holders would be entitled to
compensation.' 5
Chief Justice Mason and Justices McHugh'" and Dawson ' 7 agreed
with Justice Brennan on the power of the Crown to extinguish Aboriginal
title without compensation. In practical terms the distinction may not be
as great as it appears. The states may be able to extinguish native title
with a grant to an Aboriginal group. Thus the government of South Aus-
tralia vested in the Pitjantjatjara people some 102,630 square kilometers
(more than a tenth of-the states land area) of their traditional lands.' 8
Such an exercise of power would probably extinguish native title. The
legislation vesting the land was held in Gerhardy v. Brown 49 not to of-
fend the Commonwealth Racial Discrimination Act because its purpose
was to ensure adequate advancement of certain racial groups requiring
protection under section 8(1) of the Commonwealth Act. Other acts by
the states to extinguish title would probably violate the Act under the
ruling of Mabo v. Queensland.'50 While the Commonwealth government
has the power to extinguish Aboriginal title, it would now be politically
unacceptable for it to do so. In this regard, the Australian Aborigines may
find themselves better off than indigenous peoples whose lands were
taken by cession or conquest.
III. CONCLUSION
Clearly the judgments of the various members of the Court indicate a
strong desire to right the wrongs done to the Aboriginal people. The ap-
140. Citing Attorney General for Quebec v. Attorney General for Canada, [1921] 1 App.
Cas. 406; Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker, [1901] App. Cas. 576.
141. 107 A.L.R. at 84.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 152.
144. Id. at 156-60 (citing Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 70 D.L.R.4th 185, 482
(1991); Guerin, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 384).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 7.
147. Id. at 96.
148. Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act No. 20 of 1981.
149. Gerhardy v. Brown, 57 A.L.R. 472 (1985).
150. See generally, supra note 1.
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proaches of the majority show a great deal of ingenuity in resurrecting
rights thought dead and buried for some 200 years. The members of the
Court, however, were hamstrung by precedent and a natural caution not
to go too far. The implications of the case for Australian Aborigines are
not clear. Mabo dealt with land rights. Indigenous people, however, claim
many other rights.' 5' If Australia is no longer to be considered as settled
as terra nullius, how many other indigenous rights have survived? The
answer to this question, in the judgment of Justice Brennan, will have to
be found in the pre-existing rights and whether their recognition will
fracture the skeleton of the common law. Presumably Justices Deane and
Gaudron would answer the question according to the case law relating to
conquered territory. In either case, the question is not easily answered.
From an international perspective the decision must provide a profound
impetus to the claims of indigenous peoples everywhere.
151. Professor Nettheim lists ten specific classes of indigenous claims: physical survival,
cultural survival and cultural identity, sovereignty, self-determination, self-government,
land rights, control of land and its resources, compensation, non-discrimination, and affirm-
ative action. Garth Nettheim, "Peoples" and "Populations" - Indigenous Peoples and the
Rights of Peoples, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 107, 116 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
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